



Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Guariglia, A. and Mateut, S. (2010) ’Inventory investment, global engagement, and financial constraints in the
UK : evidence from micro data.’, Journal of macroeconomics., 32 (1). 239-250 .





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom





Durham Research Online 
 
Deposited in DRO: 





Publication status of attached file: 
Accepted for publication 
 
Citation for published item: 
Guariglia, A. and Mateut, S. (2009) 'Inventory investment, global engagement, and financial 
constraints in the UK : evidence from micro data.', Journal of macroeconomics., 
Forthcoming. 
 

















The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior 
permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that : 
 
 a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
 a link is made to the metadata record in DRO 
 the full-text is not changed in any way 
 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. 
 
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom 
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 2975 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk 
Inventory investment, global engagement, and financial 
















We use a panel of 9381 UK firms to study the links between firms’ global engagement status and their 
financial health. We estimate inventory investment equations augmented with a financial composition 
variable, and interpret the sensitivity of inventory investment to the latter as a measure of the strength of the 
financial constraints faced by firms. We find that smaller, younger, and more risky firms; and firms that do 
not export and are not foreign owned exhibit higher sensitivities. Moreover, global engagement substantially 
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1. Introduction 
A burgeoning literature has documented that, in an increasingly globalized world, exporters 
and foreign owned firms are larger, more productive, more capital-intensive, and pay higher 
wages than their purely domestic counterparts1. Yet, the effects of being an exporter or 
foreign owned on other firm characteristics have received much less attention. This paper 
seeks to fill this gap in the literature, by using a large panel of UK firms to study whether 
the two dimensions of firms’ global participation, namely export behavior and foreign 
ownership, affect firms’ financial health.  
Only a handful of papers in the literature have looked at the effects of global 
engagement on firms’ financial health, obtaining contrasting results. Along the first 
dimension of global participation, Campa and Shaver (2002) find that liquidity constraints 
are less binding for Spanish exporters compared to non-exporters; while Castañeda (2002) 
shows that export-oriented Mexican firms faced higher financial constraints before the 
1995-2000 financial paralysis than after. Along the second dimension, and focusing 
respectively on Colombia, Côte D’Ivoire, and Estonia, Arbeláez and Echavarría (2002), 
Harrison and McMillan (2003), and Mickiewicz et al. (2004) show that foreign owned 
firms face lower financial constraints compared to other firms. De Brun et al. (2002) find 
no such evidence for firms in Uruguay2. 
All the above mentioned papers analyze financial constraints in the context of fixed 
investment regressions augmented with financial variables such as cash flow. In particular, 
they consider the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as an indicator of the degree of 
financial constraints faced by firms: financially constrained firms (for whom access to 
external finance is difficult and/or expensive) can only invest if they have sufficient internal 
funds.  
                                                 
1 See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a survey on firm level adjustment to globalization. 
2 Related studies are Desai et al. (2008), who find that internal capital markets of multinational firms allow 
their affiliates to expand output after severe depreciations, when economies are fragile and prone to economic 
contractions; Blalock et al. (2008), who show that following the 1997 East Asian financial crisis which led to 
a dramatic currency devaluation, it was only those Indonesian exporters with foreign ownership who were 
able to increase investment significantly, while domestic firms were unable to do so due to financing 
constraints; and Harrison et al. (2004), who find that direct foreign investment is associated with a reduction 
of financing constraints for firms without foreign assets and for domestically owned enterprises.  
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Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we study the effects of global 
engagement on firms’ financial health in the UK. This is important because most of the 
studies that looked at similar issues generally considered developing or transition countries. 
Our choice of the UK is motivated by the fact that this country ranks high in terms of global 
engagement: it is the fifth largest exporter of manufactures in the world and the second 
largest host of multinational enterprises. Moreover, a rich firm-level dataset is available for 
the UK, that covers mostly unlisted firms, which are generally small, young, and 
particularly likely to face financial constraints.  
We expect globally engaged firms to face a lower degree of financial constraints 
compared to their purely domestic counterparts for the following reasons. First, globally 
engaged firms have access to both internal and international financial markets, which 
enables them to diversify their sources of financing and the associated risks. Specifically, 
foreign owned firms can obtain credit from their parent company, insuring themselves 
against liquidity constraints (Desai et al., 2004)3. Second, as they benefit from a lower 
bankruptcy risk and adopt international standards faster in terms of product quality, foreign 
owned firms find it easier to gain access to domestic banks (Colombo, 2001; Harrison and 
McMillan, 2003). Third, because they are also dependent on demand from foreign 
countries, exporters are less tied to the domestic cycle, and less subject to those financial 
constraints caused by tight monetary policy and recessions at home4. This leads to a more 
stable cash flow for exporters compared to non-exporters, which in turn leads to weaker 
liquidity constraints (Campa and Shaver, 2002; Garcia-Vega and Guariglia, 2008)5. Finally, 
being an exporter also provides a signal that the firm is sufficiently productive to generate 
enough profits in foreign markets to recover the sunk costs that need to be met when 
entering foreign markets for the first time (Roberts and Tybout, 1997). This increases the 
likelihood that the firm will be able to service its external debt, and further relaxes the 
liquidity constraints that it faces. 
                                                 
3 In a purely domestic framework, Hoshi et al. (1991) and Ng and Schaller (1996) consider firms belonging to 
groups as less likely to face financing constraints.  
4 This argument relies on the assumption that business cycles are not perfectly coordinated across countries. 
5 A more stable cash flow provides in fact greater assurances to lenders that the firm will be able to service its 
obligations.  
4 
Our second contribution to the literature is that we explore, for the first time, the 
links between firms’ global engagement and their financial health in the context of 
inventory investment regressions. We estimate error-correction inventory investment 
equations augmented with a financial composition variable. As in the investment literature, 
we interpret the coefficient on the latter as measures of the degree of financial constraints 
faced by firms. We explore how these coefficients differ across firms classified into 
financially constrained and unconstrained in a traditional sense (based in turn on size, age, 
and risk), on the one hand; and across globally engaged and purely domestic, on the other. 
We also compare the coefficients across globally engaged financially constrained firms and 
purely domestic financially constrained firms, with the objective of determining whether 
global engagement can shield firms from financial constraints. 
Three reasons justify our choice of inventory investment in our analysis. First, 
because of its high liquidity and low adjustment costs, inventory investment is likely to be 
more sensitive to financial variables than investment in fixed capital (Carpenter et al., 
1994). Second, inventory investment plays a crucial role in business cycle fluctuations 
(Blinder and Maccini, 1991). Third, inventory investment equations are less likely than 
fixed investment equations to suffer from misspecification due to the inappropriate control 
for investment opportunities6. 
Our results show that smaller, younger, and more risky firms, on the one hand; and 
firms that are not globally engaged, on the other, exhibit higher sensitivities of inventory 
investment to our financial composition variable. Moreover, when we differentiate among 
purely domestic financially constrained firms, globally engaged financially constrained 
firms, and financially unconstrained firms, we find that the effects of our financial variable 
are statistically significant only for the former group, implying that global engagement 
helps firms to overcome liquidity constraints. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some 
economic background for our analysis, and illustrates our baseline specification and our 
                                                 
6 Within a Q model of investment framework, Cummins et al. (2006) show that financial variables such as 
cash flow could enter significantly in an investment regression simply because they pick up investment 
opportunities which are not properly accounted for by Tobin’s Q. 
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econometric methodology. In Section 3, we describe our data and present some descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 illustrates our main empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Economic background, baseline specification, and estimation methodology 
Economic background 
Our baseline specification is motivated by a generalization of Kashyap et al.’s (1993) 
framework, which focuses on financial composition and its effects on firms’ real activities. 
Kashyap et al. (1993) assume that firms can finance their investment projects in two ways: 
either by using bank loans or by issuing commercial paper. To measure financial 
composition, they introduce a “mix” variable, defined as the ratio of bank loans to the sum 
of bank loans and commercial paper. They show that the “mix” is an important determinant 
of both inventory investment and investment in fixed capital. In other words, the 
availability of bank credit has a positive impact on fixed capital and inventory 
accumulation, as firms cannot perfectly substitute bank loans with commercial paper. 
Because, in the UK, the commercial paper market is not particularly developed, we 
consider another leading short-term substitute for bank loans, namely trade credit. 
Specifically, we use an alternative “mix” variable (labelled MIX), defined as the ratio of the 
firm’s short-term debt to the sum of its short-term debt and trade credit, where short-term 
debt is essentially made up of bank loans, and trade credit is a form of financing 
automatically created when customers delay payment of their bills to their suppliers.  
The inclusion of trade credit in our “mix” variable is motivated by the fact that this 
form of financing is widely used7. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that 
in 1991, funds loaned to customers represented 17.8% of total assets for US firms, 22% for 
UK firms, and more than 25% for countries such as Italy, France, and Germany. Similarly, 
according to Kohler et al. (2000), 55% of the total short-term credit received by UK firms 
during the period 1983-95 took the form of trade credit. As suppliers can closely monitor 
                                                 
7 Kashyap et al. (1993) themselves acknowledge the importance of considering trade credit as a short-term 
substitute for bank credit (footnote 19, p. 88). Yet, they are unable to use it in their empirical analysis, which 
is based on aggregate data.  
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their clients during the normal course of business, trade credit is available to most firms8. 
Yet, it is typically more expensive than bank credit, as customers generally do not use the 
early payment discount (Petersen and Rajan, 1997)9. 
In summary, bank lending is generally available to most firms at a reasonable cost, 
while trade credit is also widely available, but much more expensive. Consequently, 
especially for those firms more likely to face financing constraints, these two forms of 
financing are not perfect substitutes, and the proportion of financing that they obtain from 
banks is likely to affect their activities.  
As in Kashyap et al. (1993), Hoshi et al. (1993), and Huang (2003), we include our 
MIX variable in inventory investment regressions. We then examine whether the effect of 
this variable on inventory investment differs across firms a priori more and less likely to 
face financial constraints in a traditional sense; and across globally engaged and purely 
domestic firms. We interpret the sensitivity of inventory investment to MIX displayed by 
our firms as a measure of the strength of the financial constraints that they face10. A strong 
positive association between inventory accumulation and MIX indicates that having easy 
access to cheaper and more widely available bank finance facilitates inventory investment, 
probably because trade credit is too expensive for some firms. We expect the association to 
be stronger for firms a priori more likely to face financing constraints in a traditional sense, 
and for purely domestic firms11.  
 
 
                                                 
8 According to Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), more than 80% of the US firms covered in the National 
Survey of Small Business Finances used trade credit in 1987.  
9 A common form of trade credit contract is known as the “2/10 net 30” type. “2/10” means that the buyer gets 
a 2% discount for payment within 10 days. “Net 30” means that full payment is due 30 days after the invoice 
date. After that date, the customer is in default. The combination of a 2% discount for payment within 10 days 
and a net period ending on day 30 defines an implicit interest rate of 43.9%, which can be seen as the 
opportunity cost to the buyer to forgo the discount in exchange for 20 additional days of financing (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997). 
10 Contrary to Kashyap et al. (1993), Hoshi et al. (1993), and Huang (2003), we do not analyze how MIX (or 
the sensitivity of inventory investment to this variable) behaves in periods of recession and/or tight monetary 
policy. This is because our data set spans the years 1993-2003, which was a recession-free period in the UK.  
11 All our results were robust to using a broader “mix” variable defined as the ratio of the firm’s short-term 
debt to its total current liabilities (which include corporate bonds, commercial paper, and loans from finance 
and insurance companies, in addition to bank loans and trade credit). 
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Baseline specification 
The baseline specification that we use is a variant of Lovell’s target adjustment model 
(1961). Denoting with I and S the logarithms of inventories and sales, the equation for 
inventory growth that we initially estimate takes the following form: 
 
itejtvtvivitMIXtiStiItiSitStiIitI +++++−−−+−∆+∆+−∆+=∆ βββββα 4)1,1,(31,211,0  (1) 
 
The subscript i indexes firms; j, industries; and t, time, where t=1995-2003. Differences of 
the logarithms of sales and inventories are included in the regression to capture the short-
run dynamics. The term (Ii,t-1 – Si,t-1) can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of a long-
run target inventory level. This gives the specification an error-correction format. Error-
correction behavior enters the empirical framework because of adjustment costs. In their 
presence, the firm will not immediately adjust its inventory stock to the target level, which 
is assumed to be a function of sales. We specify a dynamic adjustment mechanism between 
I and S (the details of which are contained in Appendix 1). To be consistent with error-
correction behavior, the coefficient associated with the term (Ii,t-1 - Si,t-1) should be negative: 
if the stock of inventories (I) is lower (higher) than the target (S), then future inventory 
investment should be higher (lower). 
MIX denotes our financial composition variable12. We interpret the coefficients 
associated with this variable as a measure of the strength of the financial constraints faced 
by our firms. Specifically, we explore how these coefficients differ across firms classified 
into financially constrained and unconstrained in a traditional sense (based in turn on size, 
age, and risk), on the one hand; and across globally engaged and purely domestic, on the 
other. In order to determine whether global engagement plays a role in shielding firms from 
financial constraints, we compare the coefficients across globally engaged financially 
constrained firms and purely domestic financially constrained firms13. 
                                                 
12 MIX is evaluated at time t. This can be motivated by the fact that inventory investment has low adjustment 
costs, and can therefore quickly react to changes in financial variables (Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998).  
13 Other studies that estimated reduced-form inventory investment equations considered the sensitivity of 
inventory investment to cash flow as an indicator of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms (Benito, 
8 
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of four components: vi, which is a firm-
specific component; vt, a time-specific component accounting for possible business cycle 
effects, and more specifically for effects due to changes in interest rates; vjt, a time-specific 
component which varies across industries accounting for industry-specific shifts in 
inventory investment demand; and eit, an idiosyncratic component. We control for vi by 
estimating our equation in first-differences; for vt by including time dummies; and for vjt by 
including industry dummies interacted with time dummies in all our specifications14. 
 
Estimation methodology 
All equations are estimated in first-differences, to control for firm-specific, time-invariant 
effects. Given the possible endogeneity of the regressors, we use a first-difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach15. Two or more lags of each of the 
regressors are used as instruments.  
To check whether the first-difference GMM estimator is likely to suffer from finite 
sample bias, we compared the GMM and the Within Groups estimates of the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable in Equation (1). Because the Within Groups estimate is 
typically downward biased in short panels (Nickell, 1981), one would expect a consistent 
estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to lie above this estimate. As 
our GMM coefficient was larger than its Within Groups counterpart, we concluded that the 
first-difference GMM estimates are unlikely to be subject to serious finite sample bias16. 
                                                                                                                                                     
2005; Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998; and Guariglia, 1999). Cash flow is often negative in our dataset. This is 
because our dataset includes a number of very small firms, which are typically very young, and possibly start-
up firms. As a negative cash flow cannot really be interpreted as a measure of the availability of internal funds 
to the firm, or of the healthiness of the firm’s balance sheet, we preferred not to use this variable in our main 
specifications. Nevertheless, in Section 4, we check the robustness of our results to adding the cash flow to 
tangible fixed assets ratio to equation (1). 
14 Firms are allocated to one of the following nine industrial sectors: metals and metal goods; other minerals, 
and mineral products; chemicals and man made fibres; mechanical engineering; electrical and instrument 
engineering; motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment; food, drink, and tobacco; textiles, clothing, 
leather, and footwear; and others (Blundell et al., 1992). Including industry-level time dummies in our 
regressions ensures that the results aimed at differentiating between globally engaged and purely domestic 
firms are not simply due to cross-industry variations. 
15 See Arellano and Bond (1991) on the application of the GMM approach to panel data. The command 
xtabond2 devised by D. Roodman (2005) in Stata (version 9.2) is used in estimation. 
16 If the estimates obtained using the first-difference GMM estimator lie close or below the Within Groups 
estimates, one could suspect the GMM estimate to be downward biased as well, possibly due to weak 
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In order to evaluate whether our model is correctly specified, we use two criteria: 
the Sargan test (also known as J test) and the test for second-order serial correlation of the 
residuals in the differenced equation (m2). If the model is correctly specified, the variables 
in the instrument set should be uncorrelated with the error term in the relevant equation. 
The J test is the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, which, under the null of 
instrument validity, is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters. The m2 test is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a further check on the specification of 
the model and on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as instruments in the differenced 
equation17. 
 
3. Main features of the data and summary statistics 
The dataset 
Our dataset is derived from the profit and loss and balance sheet data gathered by Bureau 
Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. 
The database provides information on companies over the period 1993-200318. Over 99% 
of the firms included in the dataset are not traded on the stock market, or are quoted on 
alternative exchanges such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Off-
Exchange (OFEX) market19. Unquoted firms are more likely to be characterized by adverse 
financial attributes such as poor solvency, a short track record, and low real assets 
compared to quoted firms, which are typically large, long-established, financially solid 
companies with good credit ratings. Our data allows us therefore to find proxies for 
                                                                                                                                                     
instruments. In such case, the use of a GMM system estimator (which combines in a system the original 
specification expressed in first differences and in levels) would be required (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
17 If the undifferenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, but not 
second-order serial correlation. In our Tables, we report both the test for first-order (m1) and the test for 
second-order (m2) serial correlation of the differenced residuals. Note that neither the J test nor the m2 test 
allow to discriminate between bad instruments and model specification.  
18 A maximum of ten years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. Our data were downloaded 
early in 2004: the coverage period is therefore 1993-2003.  
19 We only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the firms in our 
dataset are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of firms belonging to groups, which 
would be included in the dataset if firms with consolidated accounts were also part of it. 
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financial constraints, characterized by a wide range of variation across observations in the 
sample. This allows us to perform sharper tests for the existence of financing constraints 
than those performed in the inventory investment literature, where datasets made up only of 
quoted firms were generally used (Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998; Guariglia, 1999; Huang, 
2003 etc.). 
The firms in our dataset operate in the manufacturing sector. We excluded 
companies that changed the date of their accounting year-end by more than a few weeks, so 
that the data refer to twelve month accounting periods. Firms that did not have complete 
records on total inventories, sales, and MIX were also dropped. Finally, to control for the 
potential influence of outliers, we excluded observations in the one percent tails for each of 
the regression variables. 
The panel used in our analysis includes therefore a total of 40949 annual 
observations on 9381 companies, covering the years 1993-2003. It has an unbalanced 
structure, with the number of years of observations on each firm varying between three and 
eleven20. By allowing for both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel partially 
mitigates potential selection and survivor bias. 
 
Sample separation criteria  
In order to evaluate whether the sensitivity of inventory investment to our financial 
composition variable differs at different groups of firms, we use two groups of sample 
separation criteria. The first group of criteria is aimed at classifying firms into financially 
constrained and financially unconstrained, and is based in turn on three traditionally used 
firm characteristics: size, age, and risk. We measure firm size using, alternatively, firm 
sales and its number of employees. Smaller and younger firms are susceptible to 
information asymmetry effects, since little public information is available for them, and it is 
difficult for financial institutions to gather this information. Obtaining external finance is 
                                                 
20 See Appendix 2 for more information on the structure of our panel and complete definitions of all variables 
used. Since a number of regressors are lagged once and since we estimate our equations in first differences, 
the dataset actually used in estimation only covers the years 1995-2003. 
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therefore likely to be particularly difficult and/or costly for them (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995)21.  
Similar considerations apply to risky firms. Our dataset includes a variable 
measuring the firm’s risk (labelled “Quiscore”), which is based on information about the 
credit ratings of the firm. It is an indicator which measures the likelihood of company 
failure in the twelve months following the date of calculation. The lower its Quiscore value, 
the more risky a firm is considered. This is a wider definition of perceived financial health 
than the commonly used bond rating, which only applies to a small fraction of rated firms 
(Whited, 1992; Kashyap and Stein, 1994). 
We consider the situation of each firm relative to that of other firms in the industry 
in which that firm operates. For example, when using firm size measured by sales as a 
sample separation criterion, we define as financially constrained within an industry in a 
given year those observations with total sales in the bottom three quartiles of the 
distribution of the sales of all the firms in that particular industry and year.22 A similar 
procedure is used when observations are classified as financially constrained on the basis of 
their number of employees, age, or Quiscore. In this way, we allow firms to transit between 
classes. Our empirical analysis will hence focus on firm-years rather than simply firms. We 
expect firm-years that are financially constrained in a traditional sense to display higher 
sensitivities of inventory investment to our financial variable. 
Our second group of criteria is based on global engagement variables. In particular, 
we consider as globally engaged those firms that export, or are foreign owned. Because 
they have access to both internal and international markets, are less tied to the domestic 
business cycle, and have been able to afford the sunk costs necessary to enter export 
markets, we expect globally engaged firms to face a lower degree of financial constraints 
                                                 
21 Note that a financially constrained firm is not necessarily financially distressed. Firms that face constraints 
at the margin could in fact be dynamic, fast-growing enterprises that exhaust their supply of cheap sources of 
funds, and hence need large amounts of external finance. 
22 Classifying firms in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of sales, number of employees, age, or 
Quiscore as financially constrained is motivated by the fact that our sample is mainly made up of unquoted 
firms, and contains a majority of relatively small firms with short track records, which are highly likely to 
face financing constraints. All our results were robust to using 70% or 80% as alternative cut-off points. 
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compared to their purely domestic counterparts, and therefore to exhibit lower sensitivities 
of inventory investment to our financial composition variable. 
 
Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics relative to our entire sample and various sub-samples of firm-years are 
presented in Table 1. Column 1 refers to the entire sample, columns 2 to 9 to the sub-
samples of financially constrained and unconstrained firm-years defined on the basis of 
traditional criteria; and columns 10 to 13 to the sub-samples defined on the basis of the 
global engagement criteria23.  
We can see that on average 74.4% of the firm-years in our sample participate in 
export markets, and that 46.2% of them are foreign owned: this indicates that global 
engagement is quite pervasive in our sample. 
It appears that firm-years with high sales and older firm-years are also larger in 
terms of asset size and employment. Similarly, firm-years characterized by positive exports 
are typically larger than firm-years that do not export. Relatively risky and relatively safe, 
and foreign owned versus purely domestic firm-years do not differ too much in terms of 
asset size and number of employees.  
Focusing on our financial composition variable, we can see that the average value of 
MIX is 0.51. This indicates that bank lending constitutes more than half of the firm’s short 
term finance. Furthermore, MIX is higher for more risky, larger, as well as for globally 
engaged firm-years. The difference in the average values of this financial variable is 
particularly pronounced between relatively risky and safe firm-years. This suggests that 
highly bank-dependent firms are more at risk from bankruptcy compared to other firms: 
these firms are therefore more likely to face financial constraints. Yet, the fact that MIX is 
higher for larger firms suggests that a high bank-dependence can also be associated with 
good financial health. However, what really points to financial constraints is not the 
                                                 
23 Note that the global engagement variables are characterized by a number of missing values. This is due to 
the fact that not all firms are required to report their export turnover, and/or whether they are foreign owned. 
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magnitude of MIX, but the effect that this variable has on firms’ inventory accumulation. 
The next section formally investigates this link.  
 
4. Empirical results 
The estimates of Equation (1) are reported in the first column of Table 224. Lagged 
inventory investment attracts a negative and precisely determined coefficient; both current 
and lagged sales growth affect inventory investment positively; and the coefficient on the 
error correction term is negative and precisely determined. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
MIX variable is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the higher the 
proportion of bank credit used by firms relative to trade credit, the more the firm can invest 
in inventories. More specifically, if MIX increased by one standard deviation, inventory 
investment would rise by 5.2%. This effect, which is consistent with the findings in 
Kashyap et al. (1993) and Hoshi et al. (1993), is economically significant. 
In column 2 of Table 2, we test whether our results are robust to including the ratio 
of cash flow to tangible fixed assets as an additional regressor in our specification25. This 
exercise is motivated by the fact that a number of authors (Carpenter and Petersen, 1994, 
1998; Guariglia, 1999; Benito, 2005) have found that cash flow is a significant determinant 
of inventory investment. We can see that adding the ratio of cash flow to tangible fixed 
assets to our equation leads to a larger coefficient associated with MIX. This confirms that 
having access to bank finance is important for inventory investment.  
Yet, the cash flow ratio has an insignificant impact on inventory investment. This 
could be explained considering the contrasting effects that cash flow may have on inventory 
investment. On the one hand, when demand increases, cash flow increases, but firms may 
need to reduce their stocks of inventories to satisfy the increased demand. This may lead to 
a negative relationship between inventory investment and cash flow. On the other hand, 
firms with higher cash flow can afford to increase their stocks of inventories, implying a 
                                                 
24 We report first-stage GMM estimates, which according to Arellano and Bond (1991), are likely to have 
better small-sample properties. The two-step estimates were, however, very similar. 
25 For the reasons discussed in footnote 13, we drop from our sample firms with more than three consecutive 
years of negative cash flow. This explains the lower number of observations in column 2 of Table 2 compared 
to column 1. 
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positive inventory investment - cash flow relationship. If of similar magnitudes, these two 
opposing effects could offset each other, leading to an insignificant cash flow coefficient. 
Another reason why our cash flow variable may attract a poorly determined coefficient is 
that cash flow and sales may be highly collinear, making it difficult to estimate the relevant 
coefficients (Bagliano and Sembenelli, 2004)26. In both columns of Table 2, neither the 
Sargan nor the m2 test indicate any problems with the choice of instruments or the general 
specification of the model. 
We next estimate the following specification, in which the effects of MIX are 











  (2) 
 
CONSit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is financially constrained at time t, and 
equal to 0 otherwise27.  
Table 3 presents the estimates of Equation (2). In columns 1 to 4, traditional 
financial constraints are measured respectively on the basis of the firms’ sales, number of 
employees, age, and credit risk. We can see that in all cases, the coefficients associated with 
MIX are statistically significant only for constrained firm-years. This result is in line with 
Carpenter et al. (1994, 1998), Guariglia (1999), and Benito (2005). 
                                                 
26 Given the insignificance of the cash flow coefficient, in the Tables that follow we only report the results 
based on MIX. All our results were robust to including cash flow as an additional regressor. These results are 
not reported for brevity, but are available on request. 
27 We prefer to use interaction terms rather than splitting the sample into sub-groups of firms and estimating 
separate regressions for each of the sub-groups, as this enables us to avoid problems of endogenous sample 
selection, to gain degrees of freedom, and to take into consideration the fact that firms can transit between 
groups. See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for a similar approach. All our results were, however, robust to 
estimating separate regressions on separate sub-samples of firms defined as financially 
constrained/unconstrained on the one hand, and globally engaged/purely domestic on the other, on the basis of 
the average of the chosen sample separation variable taken over the entire sample, or over the first three years 
of data. These results are not reported for brevity, but are available on request.  
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Our next specification looks at whether, compared to their purely domestic 
counterparts, globally engaged firms display lower sensitivities of inventory investment to 










  (3) 
 
where GEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has positive exports in year t and/or is 
foreign owned in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
Our estimates of Equation (3) are presented in Table 4. Column 1 refers to the case 
in which global engagement is measured on the basis of whether the firm exports, and 
column 2 to the case in which it is measured on the basis of whether the firm is foreign 
owned. It appears that MIX has a significant coefficient only for purely domestic firms. 
These results are in line with Arbeláez and Echavarría (2002), Campa and Shaver (2002), 
Harrison and McMillan (2003), and Mickiewicz et al. (2004), and suggest that both 
dimensions of global engagement are associated with a lower degree of financial 
constraints. 
Finally, pushing our analysis one step further, we propose a direct test for whether 
global engagement reduces the severity of the liquidity constraints that financially 
constrained firms may face. More specifically, we test whether the sensitivity of inventory 
investment to our MIX variable is lower for those financially constrained firms that are 
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Table 5 presents the estimates of Equation (4) when global engagement is 
measured in terms of export behavior. As in Table 3, in columns 1 to 4, firm-years are split 
into financially constrained and unconstrained in a traditional sense, using respectively 
firms’ sales, number of employees, age, and credit risk as sorting criteria. We can see that 
MIX only affects inventory investment at those financially constrained firm-years that do 
not export, suggesting therefore that serving foreign as well as domestic markets plays an 
important role in dampening the effects of liquidity constraints for small, young, and more 
risky firms. Finally, the J and m2 tests do not indicate any problems with the specification 
of the model and the choice of the instruments. 
We perform a similar exercise using foreign ownership as a measure of global 
engagement. It appears that only those financially constrained firm-years that are purely 
domestic display a positive sensitivity of inventory investment to our financial composition 
variable. So, just like serving foreign markets through exports, being foreign owned 
reduces the severity of the financial constraints that a firm faces. These results are not 
reported for brevity but are available on request. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have used a panel of 9381 UK firms over the period 1993-2003 to study the links 
between firms’ global engagement status and their financial health. We have estimated 
error-correction inventory investment equations augmented with a financial composition 
variable, MIX, defined as the firm’s ratio of short-term debt to short-term debt plus trade 
credit. We have then analyzed the differential effects of MIX on the inventory accumulation 
of firms more and less likely to face financial constraints in a traditional sense, on the one 
hand; and of globally engaged versus purely domestic firms, on the other.  
In line with previous studies, our results suggest that MIX only affects inventory 
investment at firms that are financially constrained in a traditional sense (i.e. small, young, 
and risky firms). Moving beyond existing literature, we also found that inventory 
accumulation at globally engaged firms is not sensitive to MIX, whereas inventory 
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investment at purely domestic firms is. This suggests that global engagement is associated 
with a lower degree of financial constraints.  
Finally, we have directly tested whether global engagement plays a role in 
attenuating the liquidity constraints faced by smaller, younger, and more risky firms. For 
this purpose we have analysed the effects of MIX on the inventory investment of purely 
domestic financially constrained firms, globally engaged financially constrained firms, and 
financially unconstrained firms. We found that our financial variable only has a statistically 
significant effect on the inventory investment of the former category. We interpreted this as 
evidence that global engagement shields firms from liquidity constraints.  
From a policy viewpoint, these results suggest that export promotion policies and 
policies providing incentives to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may be beneficial to the 
economy, not only through their well-known direct growth-enhancing role, but also 
because they are likely to reduce the level of financial constraints faced by firms, and 
consequently to indirectly enhance their investment spending and productivity. The latter 
effect is particularly relevant for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), whose 
investment is often constrained by the lack of finance. 
 
Appendix 1: The error-correction inventory model 
The baseline error-correction specification which is estimated (Equation 1) can be seen as a 
generalization of Lovell’s target adjustment model (1961). The target-adjustment model is 
based on the hypothesis that each firm has a desired target level of inventories, and that a 
firm finding its actual level of inventories different from its target level attempts only a 
partial adjustment towards the target level within any one period. As discussed in Lovel 
(1961, pp. 295-296), this partial adjustment could be due to the fact that there are costs 
involved in changing the level of stocks. Moreover, there could be problems related with 




We assume that the target stock of inventories of firm i at time t (Iit*) is related to 
the volume of sales in that period (Sit) via the following Equation, where the variables are 
expressed in logarithms: 
I it* = α + β S it          (A1) 
β is the marginal desired stock coefficient, which can also be seen as an accelerator effect: 
if sales are expected to increase, then the target stock of inventories will also increase. 
Denoting the logarithm of the actual stock of inventories of firm i at time t with Iit, 
and assuming that the actual inventory investment ∆Iit is a fraction δ of the required 
investment necessary for the firm to adjust its stocks to the equilibrium level, we can write 
∆I it = I it - Ii, t-1= δ (Iit* - I i, t-1) = δα + δβ S it - δ I i, t-1     (A2) 
This yields: 
I it = δα + δβSit + (1-δ) I i, t-1        (A3) 
We then nest Equation (A3) within a general dynamic regression model, which accounts for 
the slow adjustment of the actual stock of inventories to the desired stock. We consider an 
autoregressive distributed lag specification with up to second-order dynamics (i.e. an 
ADL(2,2) model). This leads to: 
Iit = β1 I i, t-1+β2 I i, t-2+β3Sit + β4 S i, t-1+β5 S i, t-2+ νi + vjt + νt + eit    (A4) 
The presence of lagged variables makes allowance for the fact that data are not observed in 
a state of equilibrium. We include a firm-specific effect (νi), an industry-specific time effect 
(vjt), and a regular time-specific effect (νt). Together with the idiosyncratic component, eit, 
these make up the error term of Equation (A4). We also impose the parameter restriction 
(β3 + β4 + β5)/(1 - β1 - β2) = 1, aimed at ensuring a long-run equilibrium behavior of the 
stock of inventories relative to sales. Imposing this long-run unit elasticity and 
reparameterizing the ADL model we can express Equation (A4) in an error-correction 
format: 
∆I it =-β2 ∆I i, t-1 + β3∆Sit - β5 ∆Si, t-1 – (1- β1 - β2) (Ii,t-1 -Si,t-1)+ νi + νjt + νt + eit  (A5) 
where (Ii,t-1-Si,t-1) represents the error-correction term. According to this equation, 
inventories are partially adjusted to current and past changes in sales, but in the long-run, 
they are kept approximately in line with sales. To be consistent with error-correction 
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behavior, the coefficient associated with the (Ii,t-1 -Si,t-1) term should be negative: if the 
stock of inventories moves further from (closer to) its desired level, future inventory 
investment should be higher (lower).  
We further augment our model with a financial composition variable, MIX, which 
aim at picking up financial effects on inventory investment. This yields Equation (1) in the 
paper.  
 
Appendix 2: Data 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel: 
 
 









3 21 0.22 0.22 
4 259 2.76 2.98 
5 449 4.79 7.77 
6 561 5.98 13.75 
7 655 6.98 20.73 
8 962 10.25 30.99 
9 2212 23.58 54.57 
10 4258 45.39 99.96 
11 4 0.04 100.00 
Total 9381 100.00  
 
Definitions of the variables used: 
Inventories: includes finished goods and work-in-process inventories. 
Sales: includes both UK and overseas turnover. 
Total assets: the sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets. 
Export: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports a positive amount, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign: dummy equal to 1 if the firm is foreign owned, and 0 otherwise. To be considered 
as foreign owned, the share of foreign ownership in a firm’s equity must exceed 24.99%. 
This dummy variable is only available in the last year of observations available for each 
firm. We therefore assume that a firm which was foreign owned in its last available year 
was foreign owned throughout the period in which it was observed. Given the short sample 
that we analyze, this is a reasonable assumption. Actual data on the share of foreign 
ownership in a firm’s equity are only available for a very limited number of observations. 
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MIX: ratio of short-term debt to short-term debt plus trade credit. Short-term debt includes 
the following items: bank overdrafts, short-term group and director loans, hire purchase, 
leasing, and other short-term loans, but it is predominantly bank finance. 
CFTA: ratio of cash flow to tangible fixed assets. Cash flow is defined as the sum of profit/ 
loss for the period (after tax and interest) and depreciation. 
Quiscore: indicator produced by Qui Credit Assessment Ltd, which measures the likelihood 
of company failure in the twelve months following the date of calculation. Quiscore is 
given as a number in the range from 0 to 100. The lower its Quiscore, the more risky a firm 
is likely to be. The indicator is constructed taking into account a number of factors, 
including the presence of any adverse documents appearing against the company on the 
public file, and the timeliness of getting the accounts filed. However, the most important 
factors relate to the financial performance of the company as evidenced by its balance sheet 
and profit and loss accounts. The key financial items used include turnover, pre-tax profits, 
working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, creditors, bank loans and overdrafts, 
current assets, current liabilities, net assets, fixed assets, share capital, reserves and 
shareholders funds. The underlying economic conditions are also taken into account. 
Deflators: all variables are deflated using the aggregate GDP deflator. 
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   CONSit = f (Salesit) 
 
 
CONSit = f (Employeesit) 
 
CONSit = f (Ageit) 
 
CONSit = f (Quiscoreit) 
 
GEit = f (Export it) 
 













27.4    
(185.2) 










55.7     
(217.6) 
45.9    
(644.6) 













36.3    
(213.9) 
83.7    
(491.5) 
49.7      
(274.3) 
44.1      
(399.3) 
54.5     
(325.8) 
34.5     
(176.8) 
72.9     
(302.3) 
49.8    
(393.0) 
              
Employees 388.5 
(2008.8) 
110.2    
(103.8) 






302.9   
(1504.6) 
640.1    
(3026.6) 
408.1    
(2021.8) 
335.0    
(2035.3) 
424.0    
(1873.8) 
284.7     
(958.4) 
465.8     
(1576.8) 
452.8    
(2735.2) 
              
∆Iit -0.0101 
(0.325) 
-0.006    
(0.329) 






-0.0026    
(0.335) 
-0.0335    
(0.288) 
-0.0017    
(0.329) 
-0.0303    
(0.295) 
-0.0164    
(0.311) 
-0.0088    
(0.345) 
-0.0225     
(0.331) 
-0.0095    
(0.318) 
              
∆Sit 0.0008 
(0.215) 
-0.004    
(0.216) 






0.0077    
(0.220) 
-0.0207    
(0.197) 
0.0075    
(0.217) 
-0.0117    
(0.193) 
-0.008    
(0.220) 
0.016     
(0.197) 
-0.0033     
(0.225) 
0.00001    
(0.214) 
              
Ii, t-1 – Si, t-1 -2.365 
(0.830) 
-2.378    
(0.850) 






-2.401    
(0.842) 
-2.253    
(0.783) 
-2.359    
(0.825) 
-2.397    
(0.839) 
-2.180     
(0.687) 
-2.844     
(0.957) 
-2.248    
(0.755) 
-2.376    
(0.837) 
              
MIXit  0.506 
(0.270) 
0.493    
(0.266) 






0.5058    
(0.2698) 
0.510    
(0.271) 
0.534    
(0.262) 
0.407    
(0.267) 
0.517     
(0.271) 
0.485     
(0.269) 
0.592     
(0.270) 
0.495    
(0.263) 









0.467      
(0.967) 
0.669    
(1.518) 
0.515    
(1.179) 
0.508   
(1.252) 






0.716    
(1.688) 
0.671    
(1.428) 
              
Quiscoreit 55.03 
(21.89) 
55.03    
(22.04) 






53.98    
(21.79) 
58.26    
(21.90) 
45.43    
(15.29) 
84.73     
(8.41) 
55.07     
(22.13) 
54.07    
(21.15) 
55.73     
(23.43) 
54.54   
(21.46) 
              
Ageit 30.57 
(24.03) 
28.18    
(21.97) 






19.21    
(10.77) 
65.58    
(19.38) 
29.37    
(23.35) 
34.86    
(25.71) 
32.04     
(24.6) 
28.37     
(23.22) 
29.69     
(24.55) 
33.14     
(24.83) 
              
Exportit 0.744 
(0.436) 
0.712    
(0.453) 






0.730    
(0.444) 
0.786    
(0.410) 
0.740    
(0.439) 
0.758    
(0.428) 
  0.841      
(0.365) 
0.727    
(0.445) 
              
Foreigni 0.462 
(0.499) 
0.414    
(0.493) 






0.473    
(0.499) 
0.431    
(0.495) 
0.447    
(0.497) 
0.505    
(0.500) 
0.500     
(0.500) 
0.334     
(0.472) 
  
              
Observations 40949 30735 10214 28469 9460 30914 10030 30161 9755 21766 7471 14083 16399 
  
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1993-2003. I: logarithm of inventories; S: logarithms of sales; MIX: 
ratio of short-term debt to short-term debt plus trade credit; CFTA: ratio of cash flow to tangible fixed assets; Quiscore: indicator which measures the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the date of 
calculation. The lower its Quiscore value, the more risky the firm is likely to be. Export: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports a positive amount, and 0 otherwise. Foreign: dummy equal to 1 if the firm is foreign 
owned, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable CONSit takes value 1 for firm i in year t if firm i’s sales (columns 2-3), number of employees (columns 4 and 5), age (columns 6 and 7), or Quiscore (columns 8 and 9) are 
respectively in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of the sales, number of employees, age, or Quiscore of all the firms in firm i’s industry in year t, and 0 otherwise. GEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has 
positive exports in year t and/or is foreign owned in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 2: Inventory investment and financial variables 
 







 (0.020) (0.024) 
∆Sit 0.801*** 0.902*** 
 (0.178) (0.172) 
∆Si,t-1 0.040*** 0.033* 
 (0.013) (0.020) 
Ii, t-1 – Si, t-1 -0.506*** -0.661*** 
 (0.053) (0.085) 
MIXit 0.191*** 0.327*** 
 (0.058) (0.097) 
CFTAit  -0.015 
  (0.011) 
 
Observations  


















Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m1 (m2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a 
test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments include 
∆Ii,t-2; ∆Si,t-2; (Ii,t-2 - Si,t-2); MIXi,t-2; CFTAi,t-2 (in column 2 only); and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and as instruments. Also see Notes to Table 1. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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 Table 3: Inventory investment and MIX: distinguishing firm-years on the basis of whether 
they are more or less likely to face financial constraints in a traditional sense 
 

























 (0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
∆Sit 0.501** 0.826*** 0.779*** 0.549*** 
 (0.224) (0.168) (0.146) (0.161) 
∆Si,t-1 0.034** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.028** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Ii, t-1 – Si, t-1 -0.425*** -0.498*** -0.511*** -0.473*** 
 (0.059) (0.066) (0.050) (0.055) 
MIXit*CONSit 0.349** 0.205** 0.243*** 0.145** 
 (0.163) (0.094) (0.090) (0.059) 
MIXit*(1-CONSit) -0.379 0.140 0.035 0.187 
 
 
(0.348) (0.215) (0.174) (0.141) 
 
Observations 






























Notes: The dummy variable CONSit takes value 1 for firm i in year t if firm i’s sales (column 1), number of employees 
(column 2), age (column 3), or Quiscore (column 4) are respectively in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of 
the sales, number of employees, age, or Quiscore of all the firms in firm i’s industry in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Instruments include ∆Ii,t-2; ∆Si,t-2; (Ii,t-2 - Si,t-2); MIXi,t-2; Salesi,t-2 / Employeesi,t-2 /  Agei,t-2 / Quiscorei,t-2 and further lags. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and as 
instruments. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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 Table 4: Inventory investment and MIX: distinguishing firm-years on the basis of their 
global engagement status 
 
 (1) (2) 
  
GEit = f (Export it) 
 
 







 (0.021) (0.018) 
∆Sit 0.771*** 0.717*** 
 (0.163) (0.147) 
∆Si,t-1 0.028* 0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
Ii, t-1 – Si, t-1 -0.553*** -0.496*** 
 (0.059) (0.056) 
MIXit*(1-GEit) 0.468*** 0.229** 
 (0.149) (0.115) 
MIXit*GEit 0.040 0.107 
 (0.081) (0.104) 
 
Observations  


















Notes: GEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has positive exports in year t (column 1) and/or is foreign owned in year 
t (column 2), and 0 otherwise. Instruments include ∆Ii,t-2; ∆Si,t-2; (Ii,t-2 - Si,t-2); MIXi,t-2; Exporti,t-2 / Foreigni and further lags. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and as instruments. 
Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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 Table 5: Inventory investment and MIX: distinguishing firm-years on the basis of whether 
they are more or less likely to face financial constraints in a traditional sense, and on the 
basis of their degree of global engagement measured in terms of export behavior 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
CONSit = f (Salesit) 
GEit = f (Exportit) 
 
CONSit=f(Employeesit) 
GEit = f (Exportit) 
 
 
CONSit = f (Ageit) 
GEit = f (Exportit) 
 
CONSit=f(Quiscoreit) 











 (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
∆Sit 0.672*** 0.615*** 0.787*** 0.695*** 
 (0.148) (0.163) (0.142) (0.129) 
∆Si,t-1 0.030** 0.031** 0.029* 0.022 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Ii, t-1 – Si, t-1 -0.509*** -0.474*** -0.551*** -0.553*** 

























































Notes: CONSit takes value 1 for firm i in year t if firm i’s sales (column 1), number of employees (column 2), age (column 
3), or Quiscore (column 4) are respectively in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of the sales, number of 
employees, age, or Quiscore of all the firms in firm i’s industry in year t, and 0 otherwise. GEit is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if firm i has positive exports in year t, and 0 otherwise. Instruments include ∆Ii,t-2; ∆Si,t-2; (Ii,t-2 - Si,t-2); MIXi,t-2; Salesi,t-2 / 
Employeesi,t-2 /  Agei,t-2 / Quiscorei,t-2; Exporti,t-2 and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies were always included as regressors and as instruments. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 2. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
